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DNA COLLECTION AT BIRTH: A UNIFORM
SYSTEM OF IDENTIFICATION
LENA M. CARLUCCI*
INTRODUCTION
Please consider the following three scenarios:
1. Three women get raped at knifepoint in the same Brooklyn
neighborhood within a span of four months. After performing
a rape kit on the first victim, the police placed the attacker's
DNA in the New York State DNA databank, but did not find
any matches. Although the attacker was suspected by the
NYPD to be associated with a series of muggings the year
before, he was never formally arrested.
2. A terrorist attack is successfully launched on lower
Manhattan. After diligent search efforts, local authorities are
left with the unidentified remains of approximately one
thousand people.
3. A three-year-old girl, who was adopted by her parents at birth,
gets abducted from a local Long Island playground. Ten years
later, the FBI thinks they may have found her.
Since its discovery, deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) has been used in a
variety of ways, most notably in criminal investigations and prosecutions.
Every state government, along with the federal government, currently
requires individuals to surrender a sample of their DNA in certain
situations.I The issue of compulsory DNA collection is a very controversial
* Lena M. Carlucci - B.A., Fairfield University 2008; J.D., St. John's University School of Law 2011.
I See NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, STATE LAWS ON DNA DATA BANKS: QUALIFYING
OFFENSES, OTHERS WHO MUST PROVIDE SAMPLE (2010),
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=12737 ("All 50 states require that convicted sex offenders
provide a DNA sample, and states are increasingly expanding these policies to include all felons and
some misdemeanor [sic] To date, 47 states require that all convicted felons provide a DNA sample to
the state's database."); see also COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, NAT'L REPORT,
http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/dnadata/usalusa2.html (last visited March 23, 2011)
("The Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Combined DNA Index System program (CODIS)
enables federal, state and local laboratories to store and compare DNA profiles electronically and
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one that is currently being debated on both national and state levels. The
central arguments focus on who should be forced to give their DNA to law
enforcement, when they should be forced to surrender it, and whether such
forced procedures are constitutional. Currently, New York State law
requires criminals convicted of all felonies and eighteen specified
misdemeanors to surrender their DNA.2 Their DNA is then placed in a
database in order to connect or eliminate them from investigations into any
past or possible future criminal acts. 3 Recently, there has been proposed
legislation within the state to expand this database in an effort to catch
more criminals and prevent a greater number of future crimes. This
legislation proposes DNA collection at the time of arrest, rather than at the
time of conviction, and mandatory DNA collection in all instances where
fingerprinting is necessary. 4 Critics of mandatory DNA collection argue
that such procedures violate citizens' constitutional privacy rights,
specifically the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 5 However, this Note argues that neither the current
legislation in New York, nor the proposed legislation currently before the
Senate and Assembly, go far enough to adequately meet their objectives,
thereby link serial crimes to each other and identify suspects by matching DNA from crime scenes to
convicted offenders or arrestees (where state legislation allows this). All 50 states and the FBI now
collect DNA samples, retain the profiles generated from those samples in the databases, and compare
the database entries against DNA profiles of biological evidence.").
2 See Jeffrey D. Klein, DNA Upon Arrest: Catching More Criminals Across NYS, N.Y. ST. SENATE
(Oct. 16,2009), http://www.nysenate.gov/print/24656; see also N.Y. ST. Div. OF CRIM. JUST. SERVICES,
THE NYS DNA DATABANK AND CODIS (2009),
http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/forensic/dnabrochure.htm [hereinafter N.Y. STATE Div. OF CRIM.
JUSTICE SERV., CODIS].
3 See Klein, supra note 2 ("Once the DNA sample is collected, the information goes into a
statewide DNA databank that also connects to a national databank."); see also N.Y. ST. Div. OF CRIM.
JUST. SERVICES, CODIS, supra note 2 ("The individual DNA profiles in these indices are periodically
compared with the DNA profiles from crime scene evidence contained in the Forensic Index to
determine whether an individual can be identified with crime scene evidence from one or more criminal
incidents.").
4 S. 6213, 232d Sess. (N.Y. 2009), available at http://open.nysenate.gov/legislation/bill/S6213-
2009 (explaining that S6213 is a bill currently before the New York State Senate, which proposes to
amend the executive law and criminal procedure law to require individuals arrested in connection with a
felony to submit a DNA sample); A. 6186 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2009), available at
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A06186 (proposing an amendment to the law to include DNA
collection from anyone arrested for an offense for which fingerprints are "required or permitted to be
taken" under New York criminal procedure law).
5 See e.g., ANNA C. HENNING, CONG. REs. SERVICE, COMPULSORY DNA COLLECTION: A FOURTH
AMENDMENT ANALYSIS 1 (2008), available at http://opencrs.com/document/R40077/2008-11-26/
("[M]any litigants have challenged compulsory collection and the subsequent analysis and storage of
DNA as unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.");
see also Solomon Moore, F.B.I. and States Vastly Expand DNA Databases, N.Y. TIMES, April 19,
2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/19/us/19DNA.html? r-1 ("[C]riminal justice
experts cite Fourth Amendment privacy concerns and worry that the nation is becoming a genetic
surveillance society.").
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and that the beneficial uses of DNA technology should be expanded
beyond merely detaining criminals and preventing possible crimes. This
Note advocates creating a database (first starting on the state level and then
expanding nationwide, if possible) where DNA would be collected from
every citizen at birth and entered into a system that would only be
accessible to specific trained government officials and only in a limited
number of specified instances.
The first part of this Note will discuss the history of mandatory DNA
collection in the United States, focusing primarily on federal and New
York State laws, from the founding of such databases to the current laws
governing compulsory collection. Part II of this Note will examine the
various shortcomings of the current laws, advocating that the proposed
New York legislation does not go far enough in resolving some of the
major setbacks. Part III of this Note will provide a detailed guide to the
mechanics of the proposed DNA database, including how and when DNA
should be collected, where it will be stored, what it will be used for, who
will have access to it, and when it will be accessible. The fourth and final
part of this Note will address anticipated criticisms and explain how this
proposed system would be able to pass constitutional muster.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MANDATORY DNA COLLECTION ON THE
FEDERAL AND NEW YORK STATE LEVELS
A. NDIS: The National DNA Index System
The United States first began collecting and storing DNA profiles when
the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") created the Combined DNA
Index System ("CODIS") in 1990.6 CODIS was developed in order to
create "searchable DNA databases" for forensic labs. 7 It was first started as
a "pilot software project," but federal laws quickly established the FBI's
authority to use it for law enforcement purposes.8 In 1994, the DNA
6 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CODIS COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM, available at
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis brochure; DNA Analyst Training: The CODIS Software,
NAT'L FORENSIC SCI. TECH. CTR., http://www.nfstc.org/pdi/ Subjectl0/pdislOm02 01.htm.
7 DNA.gov, Combined DNA Index System, DNA INITIATIVE, http://www.dna.gov/dna-
databases/codis (last visited March 23, 2011) (CODIS was "developed specifically to enable public
forensic DNA laboratories to create searchable DNA databases of authorized DNA profiles."); DNA
Analyst Training: Introduction, NAT'L FORENSIC SCi. TECH. CTR., http://www.nfstc.org/pdi/
Subjectl0/pdi_sl0 m02_ 00.htm (last visited March 23, 2011).
8 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 6; Stephen J. Niezgoda Jr. et al., The FBI
Laboratory's Combined DNA Index System Program, PROMEGA, available at
http://www.promega.com/geneticid proc/ussymp 6proc/ niezgod.htm.
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Identification Act enabled the FBI to establish the National DNA Index
System ("NDIS").9 CODIS allows forensic labs across the country to share
DNA data, both from unknown samples taken at crime scenes and samples
taken from suspects and criminals, and provides the main database of DNA
profiles collected from all participating labs.' 0 CODIS currently maintains
three database levels; national, state, and local. NDIS stands at the top of
the hierarchy, enabling the exchange and comparison of DNA profiles on
the national level." The system contains an offender index, where samples
collected from arrestees and convicted criminals are uploaded, and a
forensic index, where samples collected as evidence from crime scenes are
uploaded. 12 The system uses computer software to search for potential
matches on a weekly basis.13 The national database allows law enforcement
officials in various jurisdictions to work together and coordinate
investigations after they get a "hit."l4
Since its creation in 1994, the amount of DNA profiles that CODIS
stores has increased exponentially, mainly as a result of statutory
enactments. The DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act was passed by
Congress in 2000 and required samples from criminals who were convicted
9 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 6; DNA.gov, Federal Legislation on Forensic
DNA: Authorizing Legislation, DNA INITIATIVE, http://www.dna.gov/statutes-caselaw/federal-
legislation/.
10 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 6; DNA.gov, Combined DNA Index System, supra
note 7.
11 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 6; DNA.gov, What is CODIS?, DNA INITIATIVE,
http://www.dna.gov/solving-crimes/cold-cases/howdatabasesaid/codis.
12 DNA.gov, Combined DNA Index System, supra note 7 ("CODIS uses two indexes to generate
investigative leads in crimes for which biological evidence is recovered from a crime scene. The
convicted offender index contains DNA profiles of individuals convicted of certain crimes ranging from
certain misdemeanors to sexual assault and murder . . . The forensic index contains DNA profiles
obtained from crime scene evidence, such as semen, saliva, or blood."); Fed. Bureau of Investigation,
Laboratory Services: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) on the CODIS Program and the National
DNA Index System,
available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet [hereinafter Fed. Bureau
of Investigation, Lab Services FAQ].
13 DNA.gov, Combined DNA Index System, supra note 7 ("A weekly search is conducted of the
DNA profiles in this national database . . . and resulting matches are automatically returned by the
software to the laboratory that originally submitted the DNA profile."); DNA.gov, Capabilities of
CODIS Software, DNA INITIATIVE, http ://www.dna.gov/dna-databases/software.
14 See N.Y. STATE Div. OF CRIM. JUSTICE SERV., NEW YORK STATE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2007
CRIMESTAT UPDATE 24 (2008), available at
http://search.criminaljustice.ny.gov/search?q=2007+Crimestat+Report&site=dcjs&client-dcjs&proxyst
ylesheet-dcjs&output=xml_no dtd (follow "NEW YORK STATE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2007
Crimestat Report" hyperlink) ("A DNA Databank hit is a result of a match between DNA profiles
developed from crime scene evidence and a DNA offender profile stored in the DNA Databank. Law
enforcement agencies are notified of these hits, which often serve as investigative leads. The law
enforcement agency then determines the significance of the evidence in the context of other
investigative information when considering criminal charges."); see DNA.gov, DNA Database Hits,
DNA INITIATIVE, http://www.dna.gov/dna-databases/hits.
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of certain qualifying federal offenses and were in custody, on probation, or
on supervised release.15 In the beginning, "qualifying offenses" included
only the most violent of crimes, such as sex crimes, murder, and
kidnapping, due to the fact that they have high recidivism rates and
physical evidence is more likely to be left behind during their
commission. 16 In 2001, the Patriot Act expanded the scope of these
qualifying offenses to include crimes related to terrorism.17 In 2004,
Congress passed the Justice for All Act, which required that DNA be
collected from anyone convicted of a felony.18 Finally, the DNA
Fingerprinting Act of 2005 extended compulsory DNA collection to all
persons merely arrested or detained.19
Each state has the ability to create its own laws regarding compulsory
DNA collection and what constitutes as a "qualifying offense" within its
borders. Although the federal laws may serve as a model for individual
states to follow, most states have not gone as far as the federal government
in their requirements. Since federal law mandates DNA collection from
people merely detained under authority of the United States, it is broader
than most state law requirements. Currently, forty-seven states require
DNA from every convicted felon, and all fifty states require it from
convicted sex offenders. 20 However, an increasing number of states seem
to be following the federal standard. By 2009, twenty-one states had
passed laws authorizing DNA collection from certain arrestees, and it
appears as though many states will be following that lead shortly.21
B. The New York State DNA Databank
The New York State DNA Databank, which was authorized by the state
15 DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C § 14135 (2000); see U.S. v. Pool,
645 F. Supp. 2d 903, 906 n.2 (E.D. Ca. 2009), aff'd, 621 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2010).
16 HENNING, supra note 5, at 1; Moore, supra note 5.
17 HENNING, supra note 5, at 1; Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 906 n.2.
18 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(B); see Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 906 n.2.
19 Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 906 n.2; HENNING, supra note 5, at 4.
20 NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 1; see Jennifer Graddy, The Ethical Protocolfor
Collecting DNA Samples in the Criminal Justice System, 59 J. Mo. BAR 5 (2003), available at
http://oldsite.mobar.org/9a8264de-6139-4fc3-b5aO-fe8698b58d0b.aspx.
21 NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 1; Klein, supra note 2. Those states are
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Vermont, and Virginia. NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 1. See COUNCIL FOR
RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, STATES COLLECTING DNA SAMPLES FROM ARRESTEES (2011),
http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/dnadata/usa/usa2.html, for a color-coded map showing
which states currently include arrestee profiles in their DNA databases.
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legislature in section 995-c of the Executive law, was created in 1994.22
Shortly after becoming operational in August 1999, the New York State
DNA Databank got its first "hit" in February 2000, connecting a convicted
offender with DNA evidence gathered at a crime scene. 23 There are
currently eight different local DNA laboratories in New York, including the
State Police Forensic Investigation Center in Albany, which also serves as
the official State DNA Forensic Index. 24 Each of these local laboratories
receives DNA samples collected from suspects and crime scenes, which
they maintain in their own databases. 25 In turn, these local laboratories
upload DNA profiles to the state index at the State Police Forensic
Investigation Center in Albany, where they are then routinely compared to
profiles from other local labs across New York. 26 DNA profiles in the New
York State DNA Databank can be uploaded through CODIS to the National
DNA Index and compared to other crime scene and offender samples
collected throughout the nation.27 By December 31, 2008, there had been
5,815 hits in the New York State DNA Databank, the greatest percentage
of which was linked to crimes of sexual assault, followed by burglary,
homicide, and robbery.28 1,341 of those hits were reported to result in
22 See N.Y. STATE Div. OF CRIM. JUSTICE SERV., CODIS, supra note 2; N.Y. State Div. of Crim.
Justice Serv., Governor Patterson Introduces All-Crimes DNA Bill, EJUSTICE NY INTEGRATED JUST.
REP., 2010 Issue 3, at 4, 6, available at http://blog.letdanys.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/09/eJusticeNYIJReport.pdf.
23 N.Y. STATE Div. OF CRIM. JUSTICE SERV., CODIS, supra note 2; N.Y. State Div. of Crim.
Justice Serv., supra note 22, at 5.
24 N.Y. STATE Div. OF CRIM. JUSTICE SERv., CODIS, supra note 2 (providing that the eight public
forensic DNA laboratories in New York State are: Erie County Department of Central Police Services
Forensic Laboratory, Monroe Country Public Safety Laboratory, Nassau County Department of
Forensic Genetics DNA Laboratory, New York City Office of the Chief Medical Examiner Department
of Forensic Biology, New York State Police Forensic Investigation Center, Onondaga County Center
for Forensic Sciences, Suffolk County Crime Laboratory, and the Westchester County Department of
Laboratories and Research Division of Forensic Sciences).
25 See N.Y. STATE Div. OF CRIM. JUSTICE SERv., CODIS, supra note 2 (discussing the three
different levels of the DNA Index System: local (LDIS), state (SDIS), and national (NDIS)); see also
Willing, supra note 24 (revealing that the local New York State crime labs are even able to store and
reference DNA profiles that would be exempted from national databases because of federal laws).
26 See N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIM. JUSTICE SERV., CODIS, supra note 2; N.Y. State Div. of Crim.
Justice Serv., supra note 22, at 5.
27 N.Y. STATE Div. OF CRIM. JUSTICE SERV., NEW YORK STATE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2008
CRIMESTAT UPDATE 23 (2009), available at
http://search.criminaljustice.state.ny.us/search?q-crimestat+report+2008&btnG=Search&entqr-&outp
ut-xml_nodtd&sort-date%3AD%3AL%3Adi &client-dcjs&ud=l &oe=UTF-8&ie=UTF-
8&proxystylesheet-dcjs&site-dcjs (follow "Crimestat Report Cover copy.indd" hyperlink) [hereinafter
N.Y. STATE Div. OF CRIM. JUSTICE SERV., 2008 CRIMESTAT]; see generally Fed. Bureau of
Investigation, Lab Services FAQ, supra note 12 for a discussion of the DNA match search process after
a profile is uploaded.
28 N.Y. STATE Div. OF CRIM. JUSTICE SERV., 2008 CRIMESTAT, supra note 27, at 24 (specifying
that of the 5,815 hits generated, 2,565 (44%) of them were linked to sexual assaults, 1,766 (30%) to
burglaries, 538 (9%) to homicides, 448 (8%) to robberies, and 498 (9%) to various other crimes). This
pattern has been consistent throughout the years that DNA has been used. See, for example, N.Y. State
308
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convictions. 29
C. Current New York State Legislation
Just like any other state, New York is free to define from whom and
when a DNA sample must be collected and placed in the state database.
According to section 995-c(3) of the New York Executive Law:
Any designated offender subsequent to conviction and sentencing for
a crime specified in subdivision seven of section nine hundred ninety-
five of this article, shall be required to provide a sample appropriate
for DNA testing to determine identification characteristics specific to
such person and to be included in a state DNA identification index
pursuant to this article. 30
When the New York State DNA Databank was first created, law
enforcement officials were only authorized to collect samples from
criminals convicted of the most violent felonies, such as rape and murder.31
However, the law was amended in December 1999, July 2004, and again in
June 2006, in order to expand the number of qualifying offenses for which
DNA could be collected upon conviction. 32 Currently, New York requires
DNA collection after an individual is convicted of "any felony defined in
the penal law", the attempt of any such crime "where such attempt is also a
felony," or eighteen specified misdemeanors. 33 These amendments to the
Div. of Crim. Justice Serv., New York State DNA Databank Breakdown of Investigations Added: Types
of Crimes Solved (First 1000 Hits) (2003),
http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/forensic/typesofcrimesfirstl000hits.htm, for a pie chart that breaks
down the types of crimes solved using the first 1000 DNA databank hits in New York State.
29 N.Y. STATE Div. OF CRIM. JUSTICE SERV., 2008 CRIMESTAT, supra note 27, at 25. Those 1,341
convictions "represent[ed] 23% of the total hits on the Databank." Id.
30 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-c(3) (Consol. 2011).
31 N.Y. STATE Div. OF CRIM. JUSTICE SERV., NEW YORK STATE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2009
CRIMESTAT UPDATE 18 (2010), available at
http://search.criminaljustice.state.ny.us/search?q=crimestat+report+2009&btnG=Search&entqr-0&sort
=date%3AD%3AL%3Adl &output-xml no dtd&client-dcjs&ud=1 &oe=UTF-8&ie=UTF-
8&proxystylesheet-dcjs&site-dcjs (follow "2009 Crimestat Report" hyperlink) [hereinafter N.Y.
STATE Div. OF CRIM. JUSTICE SERV., 2009 CRIMESTAT]; see KATHERINE N. LAPP, Introduction to
BRUCE FREDERICK, JAMES A. GILMER & DAVID J. VAN ALSTYNE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE RESEARCH AND
INNOVATION, EXPANDING THE OFFENDER INDEX OF THE NEW YORK STATE DNA DATABANK (2002),
available at http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/exp dnal (explaining that the report compares
proposals to expand New York "State['s] DNA Data Bank by indexing those offenders convicted of
nonviolent felonies and less serious crimes as well.").
32 N.Y. STATE Div. OF CRIM. JUSTICE SERV., 2009 CRIMESTAT, supra note 31, at 18; N.Y. STATE
DIV. OF CRIM. JUSTICE SERV., CODIS, supra note 2.
33 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995(l)(7)(f) (Consol. 2011). Specifically, the Executive Law lays out the
following misdemeanors for which DNA can be collected:
[A]ssault in the third degree as defined in section 120.00 of the penal law; attempted aggravated
assault upon a person less than eleven years old, as defined in section 110.00 and section 120.12 of
the penal law; attempted menacing in the first degree, as defined in section 110.00 and section
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executive law greatly increased the number of profiles in the databank, as
they not only applied to newly convicted offenders, but also applied
retroactively to those already in custody or on probation on the date they
became effective.34 The Division of Criminal Justice Services works to
ensure that DNA samples are collected from all offenders required to give
them, a job that used to be done in large part by jails and probation
departments. 35 Now that the law has been expanded to include many
misdemeanor offenses, police officers and court personnel have joined the
effort to ensure collection from those offenders not in prison or on
probation. 36 In 2008 alone, these efforts resulted in the collection of 54,462
DNA samples. 37
Due to the increased number of DNA samples being collected, a backlog
in processing developed in 2006.38 However, in order to ensure the
efficiency of both the databank and criminal prosecutions, many samples
were sent to an outside contractor for processing and by the end of 2009,
samples were being analyzed at an average rate of thirty-six days.39
120.13 of the penal law; menacing in the second degree as defined in section 120.14 of the penal
law; menacing in the third degree as defined in section 120.15 of the penal law; reckless
endangerment in the second degree as defined in section 120.20 of the penal law; stalking in the
fourth degree as defined in section 120.45 of the penal law; stalking in the third degree as defined
in section 120.50 of the penal law; attempted stalking in the second degree, as defined in section
110.00 and section 120.55 of the penal law; forcible touching as defined in section 130.52 of the
penal law regardless of the age of the victim; sexual abuse in the third degree as defined in section
130.55 of the penal law regardless of the age of the victim; unlawful imprisonment in the second
degree as defined in section 135.05 of the penal law regardless of the age of the victim; attempted
unlawful imprisonment in the first degree, as defined in section 110.00 and section 135.10 of the
penal law regardless of the age of the victim; criminal trespass in the second degree as defined in
section 140.15 of the penal law; possession of burglar's tools as defined in section 140.35 of the
penal law; petit larceny as defined in section 155.25 of the penal law; endangering the welfare of a
child as defined in section 260. 10 of the penal law; endangering the welfare of an incompetent or
physically disabled person as defined in section 260.25.
Id. at (f).
34 N.Y. STATE Div. OF CRIM. JUSTICE SERV., 2009 CRIMESTAT, supra note 31, at 18; see also
Klein, supra note 2 (identifying the impact of the new amendments).
35 N.Y. STATE Div. OF CRIM. JUSTICE SERV., 2009 CRIMESTAT, supra note 31, at 19 (noting that
probation departments and local jails collected 60% of the total DNA specimens submitted to the DNA
Databank in 2009 and State Departments of Corrections contributed another 18% of the specimens
submitted).
36 Id. Prior to the 2006 amendment to the law, DNA specimens were generally collected by the
agency charged with incarceration or supervision of the offender. Id. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995(l)(7)(c)
(Consol. 2011).
37 N.Y. STATE Div. OF CRIM. JUSTICE SERV., 2009 CRIMESTAT, supra note 31, at 19.
38 Id. at 22; N.Y. STATE Div. OF CRIM. JUSTICE SERV., 2007 CRIMESTAT, supra note 14, at 22.39 N.Y. STATE Div. OF CRIM. JUSTICE SERv., 2009 CRIMESTAT, supra note 31, at 22. By
comparison, at the end of 2007 and 2008, the respective average processing times for DNA specimens
were 210 and 77 days. Id; see Howard Safir, DNA Technology as an Effective Tool in Reducing Crime,
FORENSIC MAGAZINE, October 1, 2007, available at www.forensicmag.com/article/dna-technology-
effective-tool-reducing-crime?page=0,2. A "combination of outsourcing and modifying the testing
process" increased the ability for processing to be accomplished faster. Id.
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Additional procedures were also put in place to ensure the integrity and
efficiency of the system. For example, samples are removed from the
databank if it is discovered that the donor was not convicted of a qualifying
offense, or if the sample was not collected and processed according to
chain of custody protocol. 40
D. Proposed New York State Legislation
With the increased number of databank hits and convictions since the
expansion of qualifying offenses in 2006, there has been a renewed push to
enlarge compulsory DNA collection in New York. Two recent bills, one
introduced to the Senate and the other to the Assembly, have proposed
amending the executive and criminal procedure laws in an effort to increase
the benefits of DNA technology and the state databank.
The first bill, A03267, was introduced to the New York State Assembly
in 2007.41 The main goal of this bill is to amend the executive and criminal
procedure laws to require DNA collection from anyone arrested (rather
than convicted) of any offense where fingerprinting is required. This
includes all felonies, misdemeanors, and loitering charges, according to
New York Criminal Procedure Law section 160.10.42 The purpose of this
bill is to prevent unnecessary crimes committed by recidivist criminals. If
DNA is collected for more offenses at the time of arrest, rather than at the
time of conviction, more criminals can be apprehended after their first
offense.
Another bill, S6213, also known as the "DNA Upon Arrest" Bill, was
introduced to the New York State Senate in October 2009, by Senator
Jeffrey Klein.43 This bill proposed amending section 995 of the Executive
40 N.Y. STATE Div. OF CRIM. JUSTICE SERV., 2009 CRIMESTAT, supra note 31, at 21. In 2008,
3,150 (or 5.8%) of the DNA samples collected were removed from the databank after it was determined
that the donor was not convicted of a qualifying offense, and 1,575 (or 2.9%) of the DNA samples were
removed due to errors in processing them. Id.
41 See A. 3267 228th Sess. (N.Y. 2007), available at
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default-fld=&bn=AO3267&term=&Summary-Y&Actions=Y&Text=Y
A03267 was sponsored by Assemblyman Robin Schimminger. Id.
42 Id. A03267 proposes to establish the Commission for Exoneration Review, which would serve to
overlook cases where convicted individuals were exonerated through DNA evidence. Id.; see John D.
Biancamano, Arresting DNA: The Evolving Nature of DNA Collection Statutes and their Fourth
Amendment Justifications, 70 OHIo ST. L.J. 613, 613 (2008) which notes that Michael Bloomberg,
Mayor of New York City, proposed legislation that would require DNA samples from all individuals
arrested in the city. Id.
43 S. 6213, supra note 4; see Klein, supra note 2 (stating that Senator Klein was joined in his
proposal by John Walsh (host of the popular television show America's Most Wanted), Bronx District
Attomey Robert Johnson, Representatives from the Crime Victims Treatment Center with St. Luke's
Roosevelt Hospital, Safe Horizon, and the Surviving Parents Coalition).
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Law to require individuals arrested in connection with a felony to submit a
DNA sample, rather than waiting for a conviction, similar to A03267.44
The goal of this bill is to save investigation time, prosecution time, and
court time, and to help apprehend repeat offenders faster.45 Senator Klein
urged New York to join numerous other states, and the federal government,
which have already passed laws mandating DNA collection upon arrest.46
The justification for this proposed bill includes the brutal rape and
murder of Carol Nelson by Glen Shoop in Syracuse in 2007.47 In 2004,
Shoop was arrested for assault, unlawful imprisonment, and menacing, and,
in 2005, pled guilty to third degree assault, an offense for which DNA
collection was not required.48 In 2006, Shoop was arrested for rape,
criminal sexual act, and unlawful imprisonment, but was not required to
surrender his DNA until he was actually convicted. 49 He pled guilty to
unlawful imprisonment in 2007.50 At this time, the police were able to link
his DNA to an unsolved rape that occurred in 2000, but it was too late to
prevent him from raping and murdering Carol Nelson.51 Had the law
required Shoop to provide his DNA upon either his arrest or conviction for
assault in 2004 and 2005, respectively, he would have then been linked to
the 2000 rape, his resulting incarceration would have prevented him from
committing his subsequent crimes in 2006 and 2007, and Carol Nelson
would likely still be alive.
II. INADEQUACIES IN BOTH THE CURRENT AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION
There are numerous flaws in both the current and proposed New York
legislation that prohibit our state from successfully attaining the goals the
44 S. 6213, supra note 4. "Section 2 amends the executive law section 995-c to require that felony
arrestees provide a DNA sample to jailor detention facility personnel upon booking following arrest."
Id.
45 Id.; Klein, supra note 2.
46 S. 6213, supra note 4; see NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note I (listing the states
that have already passed DNA upon arrest legislation).
47 S. 6213, supra note 4 (describing the rape and murder of Carol Nelson under the "justification"
section of the bill); see Klein, supra note 2 (quoting William Fitzpatrick, Onondaga County District
Attorney, as saying, "[h]ad this law been in place in New York, my constituent Carol Nelson would be
alive today and I would not have to explain to her grieving family why Glen Shoop was free to murder
her.").
48 S. 2857, 234th Sess. (N.Y. 2011), available at http://open.nysenate.gov/legislation/bill/S2857-
2011. (S. 2857 is the newest posted version of A. 3267, supra note 41.)
49 S. 6213, supra note 4.
50 Id. (stating that Shoop pled guilty to first degree unlawful imprisonment, which is a felony in
New York).
51 Id. "When Shoop's DNA was finally taken and entered into the DNA database due to the
unlawful imprisonment conviction, he was linked to both Carol's murder and the 2000 rape." Id.
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Legislature set out to achieve. The three scenarios at the beginning of this
Note highlight the flaws in our current system. This part of the Note shows
how neither of the proposed bills would cure these flaws, and introduces
potential benefits of a DNA databank that would be impossible under both
the current and proposed systems.
In the first scenario, the same man raped three women within a four-
month period. Although the attacker was the subject of NYPD
investigations, he was never formally arrested. Under current New York
law, the rapist's DNA would not be on file in the state databank because he
was never convicted of a felony. Thus, the unidentified DNA profile
collected from the first victim would not yield a match and the rapist would
be free to victimize the other two women. Likewise, even if the proposed
legislation were enacted, this man would not be apprehended though a
DNA match in this scenario. Since he was never formally arrested, a
"DNA upon arrest" law would be of no effect.
In the second scenario, authorities are left with the remains of
approximately one thousand people after a devastating terrorist attack.
Family members scramble to identify their loved ones and try to attain a
sense of closure, but in many situations, this may be impossible. Unless
any of the decedents were convicted felons (or under the proposed
legislation, had been arrested) their DNA would not be in the databank.
Therefore, identifying their bodies would not only be extremely time
consuming, but nearly impossible in many situations. 52 Unless DNA could
be extracted from things such as the decedent's hairbrush or toothbrush
(which is not always feasible), it is possible that their remains would never
be identified.
In the third scenario, the FBI receives a tip that identifies a teenage girl
as someone who was kidnapped ten years ago, when she was only three
years old. Since the girl was so young when she was abducted, she has no
memories of the parents that adopted her right after she was born.
Furthermore, since they are not her biological parents, they will not be able
to match their own DNA to hers. Therefore, it would be very hard to prove
52 See Richard Willing, About Half ofNew York Remains Have Been Identified, USA TODAY, Sept.
11, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-09-1 1-septl I-remains x.htm
(discussing victim identification five years after September 1 1" and stating that "only 10,933 of the
20,730 body parts recovered were matched to known victims, whereas the other 9,797 body parts
remained unidentified. The majority of those that were identified were done so through DNA analysis
because other identification techniques, such as fingerprints and dental records, could not be employed
on the body parts."); see also Remains of a Day: Half of New York 9/11 Victims Identified by ME, 167
CANADIAN MED. Ass'N JOURNAL 910, 910 (2002), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC128417/ (explaining that only half of the presumed
victims of 9/11 had been identified by the medical examiner as of publication in 2002).
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that this teenager is in fact their adopted daughter.
In each of these three scenarios, neither the current New York laws
regarding mandatory DNA collection, nor the proposed legislation, would
provide any assistance. These three situations expose some of the flaws in
our system and highlight some areas where DNA technology should be put
to use. Shortcomings of our current system include the fact that it only
targets recidivist criminals, doesn't end the debate over who should be
forced to surrender their DNA, therefore promoting a form of inequality,
and ignores the other benefits of DNA technology outside the context of
criminal investigations.
A. Legislation Only Targets Recidivist Criminals
The first problem with both the current and proposed New York
legislation is that it only targets recidivist criminals. Under the current law,
New York only collects DNA from criminals after they have been
convicted of a felony. If the proposed legislation were adopted, DNA
would be collected from individuals upon arrest for any felony,
misdemeanor, or loitering charge. Under either statutory scheme, storing
these individuals' DNA in the databank would only be beneficial in linking
them with a DNA sample they left behind at a second crime scene.
Furthermore, the current system only starts to take effect once a suspect has
been detained by law enforcement. If a serial rapist attacks twenty
different women and leaves DNA at every crime scene, law enforcement
will not be able to connect him with these crimes until they have arrested
him, collected a DNA sample from him, and obtained a hit from the
databank that matched his profile with one from an unsolved crime.
Therefore, the current databank does little to help criminal investigations
where the offender has only committed one crime, rather than a series of
crimes. Additionally, it only provides a benefit after the offender has been
apprehended by police.
B. Legislation Promotes a Form ofInequality
Another flaw in the current and proposed New York legislation is that it
promotes a form of inequality by only forcing certain classes of individuals
to surrender their DNA, such as those convicted of felonies, or those placed
under arrest. Furthermore, critics argue that DNA databanks "exacerbate
racial disparities in the criminal justice system" because African
Americans, for example, make up an estimated 40% of the samples in the
federal database, even though they only make up about 12% of the
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population. 53 The demographics of the DNA databases reflect the criminal
population.54 However, since there are concerns that people of color are
more likely than whites to be suspected of crimes, and therefore stopped,
searched, and arrested more often, critics argue that their DNA profiles are
being "over-represented" in the databanks, which in turn serves only to
"intensify existing racial inequality."5 5 Since minorities come into contact
with law enforcement more often than whites, and therefore supply more of
the DNA profiles in the databanks, the concern is that these minorities are
more likely to be connected to DNA evidence from a crime scene.56 Rather
than solving any of these issues, the proposed legislation is likely to further
fuel the debate over who should be forced to surrender their DNA. If this
legislation is passed, there will undoubtedly be more proposals to further
expand the databank in the future, especially considering how many times
the law has been amended in the last decade alone. 57
C. Legislation Only Uses The DNA Databank in the Criminal Context
The last, and probably most significant, shortcoming in the legislation on
compulsory DNA collection is that it fails to take into account the fact that
the DNA databank could be put to a number of other beneficial uses
outside of the criminal investigations/prosecutions context. Currently, our
mandatory DNA laws and advanced DNA databank are only being utilized
to apprehend and imprison criminals and deter future crimes. However,
53 Moore, supra note 5.
54 See id. (discussing how one former prosecutor stated that DNA demographics reflect the
criminal population); see also U.S. v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 199 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that
DNA samples could be taken from groups that share demographic characteristics which would suggest
a higher likelihood of criminal behavior).
55 Sujatha Byravan, Racism by Other Means, THE HINDU (August. 9, 2006), available at
http://www.thehindu.com/2006/08/09/stories/2006080908351 100.htm. "In such a racially biased
system, the DNA of people of colour [sic] - who are stopped, searched, tried, convicted, and penalised
[sic] more often - would obviously be over-represented in the expanding forensic DNA databanks, and
this would intensify existing racial inequality." Id.; see Our Right to Privacy, Unless Guilty of a Crime,
THE INDEPENDENT, (Feb. 28, 2008), available at http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/leading-
articles/leading-article-our-right-to-privacy-unless-guilty-of-a-crime-788492.html for a discussion on
how ethnic minorities are vastly over-represented in DNA databases in the U.K.
56 See GENETICS AND PUB. POLICY CTR., JOHN HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, DNA, FORENSICS AND THE
LAW (2007), available at http://www.dnapolicy.org/policy.issue.php?action=detail&issuebrief id-42
(explaining that [critics] "argue that since only those who come into contact with law enforcement are
entered into databases, disparate arrest and conviction practices will result in a disproportionate number
of minorities being included in the databases."); see also Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 314 (4th Cir.
1992) (stating that DNA testing of minorities would likely increase the likelihood of solving crimes).
57 See N.Y. State Div. of Crim. Justice Serv., CODIS, supra note 2 (noting the expansions in
December 1999, July 2004, and June 2006); see also N.Y. State Div. of Crim. Justice Serv., DNA HITS
BY LAW EXPANSION AS OF MAY 2007, http://criminal
justice.state.ny.us/forensic/graphics/databankhits.jpg (last visited Mar. 24, 2011) (graphing the DNA
hits in each year the laws were expanded).
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DNA has proven very valuable for identification purposes after tragedies
such as 9/11 and the recent earthquake in Haiti. 58 Nevertheless, thousands
of human remains have yet to be identified because there is no DNA
available to match with that of missing persons. Although DNA can be
collected on a voluntary basis in these non-criminal contexts, it may be too
late to procure a sample by the time it is actually needed. Therefore,
mandatory collection of DNA outside of the criminal context would be
beneficial in these circumstances, and would ensure that as many people as
possible would be identified.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION: DNA COLLECTION AT BIRTH
This Note proposes that a solution to the inadequacies of the compulsory
DNA legislation would be to create a database where DNA is required to
be collected from every citizen shortly after birth. Such a database would
first be created on the New York state level, followed by the national level
if technologically feasible.
A. The Mechanics of a "DNA at Birth " Databank
Ideally, DNA collection would become a routine administrative task
performed by health care professionals, just as certain procedures are
employed after birth to ensure a newborn's health. After a doctor or nurse
collects the DNA sample by either setting aside some of the blood already
drawn from the newborn for other standard testing,59 or by performing a
mere cheek swab, they would send it to the local forensic laboratory for
analysis and entry into the state database. All health care professionals
would have to undergo training to ensure proper collection and storage of
the DNA sample and to ensure that secure chain of custody procedures are
followed. For those children not born in a hospital, the state would require
the parents to procure a sample in order to obtain a birth certificate.
58 See Willing, supra note 24 (stating that 53% of the remains from September 11 had been
identified by DNA alone); Elizabeth Cohen & John Bonifield, DNA Testing Confirms Haitian Couple
Are Parents of Baby Sent to US., CNN.COM (Mar. 17, 2010), available at
http://www.cnn.com/2010/HEALTH/03/17/haiti.baby.jenny/index.html (describing how DNA testing
was used to confirm the parentage of an injured baby girl sent to the United States after the Haitian
earthquake).
59 See N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, GENETIC TESTING AND SCREENING IN THE AGE OF GENOMIC
MEDICINE, http://www.health.ny.gov/regulations/taskforce/reports_publications/screening.htm
[hereinafter GENETIC TESTING AND SCREENING] (describing the newborn screening process in New
York State); see also WADSWORTH CENTER: NY ST. DEP'T OF HEALTH, NEWBORN SCREENING
PROGRAM, http://www.wadsworth.org/newbom [hereinafter NEWBORN SCREENING PROGRAM] (stating
that newborns in New York are screened for disorders by testing a sample of blood obtained by pricking
the baby's heel, usually on the day they are discharged from the hospital).
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Under this proposed model, DNA would still be collected from arrestees,
unless their DNA was already on file. However, no adults or living
children would be forced to surrender their DNA, although they may do so
on a voluntary basis. The DNA at Birth legislation would take effect on a
certain day after being enacted, and DNA would be collected at birth only
from children born on that day forward. Therefore, DNA collection at birth
would be a phased-in process that would become normalized as time went
on. Ten years after a person dies, their DNA profile would be deleted from
the system.
This proposed database would only be used for identification purposes.
Similar to the procedures currently in place, the forensic analysts would
only use "junk DNA" in creating the DNA profiles that would be placed in
the database. 60 "Junk DNA" is the portion of DNA that researchers have
concluded contains only "non-genic" information that is not "responsible
for trait coding." 61 This means that the profiles stored in the database
would not contain any information about the individual's physical or
medical characteristics, and would be strictly used for identification only.
Although DNA has the potential to reveal certain distinguishing
characteristics, the use of "junk DNA" in such databases eliminates that
risk because its only known function is for "the analysis of identifying
markers." 62
The DNA databank would be monitored by highly trained and skilled
officials. Only authorized personnel would be able to access the
information contained in the databank. Furthermore, those authorized to
access the information contained in the databank would only be able to do
so in very limited circumstances, such as in criminal investigations,
criminal trials, and identity confirmation.
B. Benefits of a "DNA at Birth" Databank
Creating a DNA database where samples are collected from every citizen
at birth would mend many of the flaws in the current system and enable the
benefits of DNA technology to be put to use. Such a system would resolve
60 See Henning, supra note 5, at 2 (explaining the process the FBI uses to create DNA profiles);
U.S. v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that the Bureau for DNA analysis only
analyzes 13 markers (or loci) that are found on what is known as "junk DNA," which is "non-genic
stretches of DNA not presently recognized as being responsible for trait coding.").
61 Kincade, 379 F.3dat 818.
62 Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 670 (2d. Cir. 2005). "Although science may someday be able
to unearth much more information about us through our junk DNA, that capability does not yet exist,
and, more importantly, the New York Statute prohibits such analysis." Id.
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the problems posed by the three scenarios listed at the beginning of this
Note in a way that neither the current nor the proposed legislation could.
In the first situation, the attacker's DNA would have linked him to the
first rape, and he would have been apprehended before being able to
commit the next two rapes. If DNA were collected at birth we would be
able to identify criminals after their first offense, rather than waiting for
them to commit a second crime and linking them together. Furthermore, it
may serve to deter many more people from committing crimes altogether
since the potential that they would be caught after their first offense would
be much greater if their DNA profile was already on file.
In the second situation, all the human remains that could be analyzed for
DNA could be matched to DNA profiles already in the databank.
Therefore, most of the bodies could be identified. In the third and final
scenario, all that would need to be done to ascertain whether the teenager
was the same girl who went missing ten years earlier would be to match her
DNA to the little girl's DNA that was collected at birth and stored in the
databank. Both of these situations highlight the fact that if DNA was
collected at birth, its identification quality could be used for more than just
criminal investigations. In addition to identifying bodily remains and
missing children, DNA collection at birth would greatly decrease the need
for paternity suits because there would be no need to legally compel
someone to give their DNA.
Lastly, if DNA were collected from citizens at birth, it would virtually
eliminate government discretion and the debate over deciding which
individuals must provide samples. If every single citizen's DNA were
collected, there would be no need for continued pushes to amend the law to
include more "qualifying offenses" and there would be no more arguments
that the law unfairly burdens certain classes of individuals more than
others.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
It is obvious that such a controversial proposal will be met with rigorous
opposition. In order for a system like this to succeed, it must be able to
pass constitutional muster. Since courts have already declared that the
extraction and analysis of tissue and blood samples for DNA constitutes a
search, a DNA at Birth law would have to withstand Fourth Amendment
prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures. 63 Therefore,
63 See Henning, supra note 5, at 6. "[A]lthough the [Supreme] Court views the drawing of blood as
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collecting DNA at birth would need to be considered "reasonable" in order
for it to satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
A. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF OTHER SUSPICIONLESS SEARCH PROGRAMS
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures, which basically refers to those searches not premised on probable
cause and a warrant. 64 Collecting DNA from infants is a search not based
on either probable cause or a warrant, so it classifies as a suspicionless
search program. Since searches conducted without a basis of
individualized suspicion are normally considered unreasonable, there are
very limited circumstances in which courts will allow suspicionless search
programs. 65 Collecting DNA at birth would need to fall into one of these
exceptions to be considered constitutional.
One category of cases dealing with the constitutionality of suspicionless
searches involves challenges to mandatory drug testing programs. These
cases are worth discussing because their analysis under the Fourth
Amendment will be analogous to the constitutional analysis of a DNA at
Birth program. Courts have used different methods for determining the
reasonableness of suspicionless searches, but they generally use the Special
Needs test with drug-testing programs since these programs are usually not
"designed to serve the ordinary needs of law enforcement." 66 The Special
Needs test has two prongs: The court must first determine that the search is
"justified by a special need beyond the ordinary needs of normal law
enforcement," and second, that the search is reasonable in comparison to
the special need.67 Three factors to consider in the balancing test for
a greater intrusion than fingerprinting, both activities now qualify as searches." Id. at n.39. In 2005, the
Second Circuit held that invasive measures of collecting DNA for analysis constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search. Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 658; see also U.S. CONsT. amend. IV which guarantees "the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures."
64 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.; see Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-27 (1987) for an example of
the Supreme Court's application of the Fourth Amendment.
65 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) ("A search or seizure is ordinarily
unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing."); U.S. v. Amerson, 483 F.3d
73, 78-79 (2d Cir. 2007) ("[S]uspicionless searches . . . are highly disfavored since they dispense with
the traditional rule that a search, if it is to be deemed reasonable, must be either supported by a warrant
based on probable cause, or justified by evidence establishing individualized suspicion of criminal
misconduct.").
66 Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666 (1989) [hereinafter Von
Raab]. "[W]here a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special govemmental needs, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy expectations against the
Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of
individualized suspicion in the particular context." Id. at 665-66.
67 Amerson, 483 F.3d at 80 (analyzing the 2004 DNA Act under the two prongs of the Special
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determining reasonableness are: (1) the degree of government intrusion, (2)
the individual's privacy interest, and (3) the nature of the government's
needs and the program's efficacy in meeting those needs. 68
The United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a
suspicionless drug-screening program in National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab.69 In that case, the United States Customs Service
implemented a drug-testing program where any employee seeking a job
involving drug interdiction, carrying a firearm, or handling classified
material, was required to submit to a urinalysis test. 70 The Supreme Court
held that the suspicionless drug testing of those employees who would be
dealing with illegal drugs or carrying a firearm was a reasonable search
under the Fourth Amendment. The government's compelling interest, of
ensuring that drug users are not promoted to positions maintaining our
nation's borders or protecting the citizenry, was held to outweigh the
privacy expectations of such employees, which are diminished by the very
nature of the government responsibility their jobs entail.71
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of another suspicionless
drug-testing program in Board of Education v. Earls.72 In that case, a
school district implemented a program where every middle and high school
student who participated in extracurricular activities was required to submit
a urine sample for analysis. 73 The Court held that this program was
reasonable in light of the school board's interest in preventing drug use
among students, the diminished privacy expectation of students choosing to
participate in extracurricular activities, the minimally intrusive method of
collecting urine samples, and the reasonably effective means of addressing
the problem. 74
Although the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
suspicionless programs in Earls and Von Raab, there are many cases where
courts have held that drug-testing programs are searches that violate the
Needs test as it applies to convicted felons on probation); id. at 84 n.10 ("The need is 'special' in the
context of the Fourth Amendment, not because it is necessarily or likely to be more important than other
needs, but because the normal presumption that warrants and probable cause are needed is not
present.").
68 Id. at 83-84 (quoting Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir. 2006); Palmieri v. Lynch,
392 F.3d 73, 81 (2d. Cir. 2004).
69 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 679.
70 Id. at 660-61.
71 Id. at 679. The Court remanded on the issue of whether the drug tests were reasonable for those
employees who would be handling "classified" material because the record proved insufficient for this
decision. Id.
72 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
73 Id at 826.
74 Id. at 837-38.
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Fourth Amendment. In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Court held that
performing urine testing on pregnant women in order to determine if they
were using cocaine was unconstitutional. 75 This program did not pass the
Special Needs test because the primary purpose of the program was to "use
the threat of arrest and prosecution" to force women into rehabilitation. 76
The Court found that the immediate objective of the program was to
produce evidence of illegal drug use that would be turned over by hospital
personnel to law enforcement officials, which the Court held was an
ordinary law enforcement purpose, and not one that justified dispensing
with the warrant and probable cause requirement. 77 Similarly, in Tannahill
v. Lockney Independent School District, the court held that drug testing of
all students in grades seven through eleven was unconstitutional because
there was no evidence that drug use was a particular problem among the
students and therefore found no demonstrated special need. 78 Furthermore,
the court held that the students in this case did not have a diminished
expectation of privacy since every student was subjected to drug testing,
rather than only student athletes or those involved in extracurricular
activities.79
A program where DNA is collected at birth can be distinguished from
these last two cases because of the special need of such a program and the
diminished privacy expectation of newborns with regard to their DNA
profile, which will be discussed in the next subsection. Similar to the
suspicionless drug testing programs in Von Raab and Earls, the
government does have a compelling non-law enforcement interest in
collecting individual's DNA, and such a program would be effective in
serving a government need beyond the normal needs of law enforcement.
B. THE SPECIAL NEEDS TEST IN DNA-RELATED CASES
Nearly every court that has heard a DNA collection case has upheld the
search programs created by both state and federal DNA laws, using either a
totality of the circumstances balancing test or the Special Needs test.80 The
75 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
76 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84.
77 See id. ("Given the primary purpose of the Charleston program, which was to use the threat of
arrest and prosecution in order to force women into treatment, and given the extensive involvement of
law enforcement officials at every stage of the policy, this case simply does not fit within the guarded
category of 'special needs.").
78 Tannahill v. Lockney Indep. Sch. Dist.,133 F. Supp. 2d 919, 924 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
79 Id. at 929.
80 See Henning, supra note 5, at 1 ("Although they have reached their conclusions using different
analytical approaches, federal and state courts have generally upheld compulsory DNA collection as
non-violative of the Fourth Amendment."); see also U.S. v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 2007)
("[C]ourts have nearly unanimously upheld the suspicionless-search programs created by state and
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Second Circuit has used the Special Needs test. 81
New York federal courts have already determined that DNA indexing is
considered a special need.82 In Nicholas v. Goord, the Second Circuit
upheld the constitutionality of New York compulsory DNA laws as applied
to felons on probation, noting that although the laws are put in place to help
police solve crime, DNA is not always collected as evidence or in
association with any ongoing criminal investigation. 83 Therefore, the court
concluded that "[b]ecause the state's purpose in conducting DNA indexing
is distinct form the ordinary 'crime detection' activities associated with
normal law-enforcement concerns, it meets the special-needs threshold." 84
Two years later, in United States v. Amerson, the Second Circuit further
held that DNA collection constitutes a special need "because the 'special'
law enforcement activity of creating and maintaining a DNA index fulfills
important purposes that could not be achieved by reliance on 'normal' law
enforcement methodology."8 5 A program that collects DNA from citizens
at birth, and not just from arrestees and convicts, would more likely fill the
requirements of a "special need," in order to dispense with the probable
cause and warrant requirement, because these DNA searches would be
completely outside the criminal context. DNA collection at birth is a
purely suspicionless program. Since it would be pushed even further
outside the realm of "normal law enforcement" it logically follows that
such a program would be considered a special need, even more so than
current DNA collection.
The next step in evaluating the constitutionality of a DNA at Birth
program under the Special Needs test is to assess whether it is reasonable.
The Second Circuit has determined reasonableness by balancing the
government's interest in implementing the program against the level of
intrusion the program poses on the individual. 86 Although every U.S.
federal DNA indexing laws."); U.S. v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 830-31 (9th Cir. 2004).
81 The Second Circuit, along with the Seventh Circuit, has used the Special Needs test in
evaluating the constitutionality of DNA laws. See Amerson, 483 F.3d at 78; U.S. v. Hook, 471 F.3d
766, 773 (7th Cir. 2006). The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have used the totality of
the circumstances balancing test. See U.S. v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2005); Padgett v.
Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 2005); Kincade, 379 F.3d at 832; Groceman v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413 (5th Cir. 2004); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 310-11 (4th Cir. 1992).
82 See Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652,669 (2d. Cir. 2005); see also Amerson, 483 F.3d at 82.
83 Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 669. "Although the DNA samples may eventually help law enforcement
identify the perpetrator of a crime, at the time of collection, the samples in fact provide no evidence in
and of themselves of criminal wrongdoing, and are not sought for the investigation of a specific crime."
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted. Id.)
84 Id.
85 Amerson, 483 F.3d at 82.
86 See id. at 80; Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir.1999).
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Circuit court that has heard compulsory DNA cases has upheld at least
some version of federal or state laws on the issue, those cases have only
questioned the constitutionality of collection as applied to criminals.87
Therefore, a different and much stronger analysis will be required to
uphold a program where DNA is collected at birth.
1. Degree of Government Intrusion
Analyzing the degree of governmental intrusion imposed on the
individual by collecting a DNA sample would be the same regardless of
whether DNA is collected from arrestees, convicted criminals, or
newborns. Although there are different methods of obtaining a DNA
sample, courts have consistently held that taking a blood sample is
minimally intrusive. 88 Although the Supreme Court has never heard a DNA
collection case, it has held that a blood test is minimally intrusive: "[T]he
intrusion occasioned by a blood test is not significant, since such 'tests are
a commonplace in these days of periodic physical examinations and
experience with them teaches that the quantity of blood extracted is
minimal, and that for most people the procedure involves virtually no risk,
trauma, or pain."' 89 If a blood test is considered minimally intrusive, then it
logically follows that a mere cheek swab, the other most common way of
obtaining a DNA sample, is even less physically intrusive. In addition,
taking a DNA sample shortly after birth might not impose any additional
intrusions into an individual's life. Since the health status of newborns is
routinely checked after birth, subjecting their already existing blood sample
to one more test would pose no addition burden.90 Furthermore, in
Nicholas, the Second Circuit concluded that the physical intrusion imposed
by a blood sample or cheek swab is "far outweighed by the government's
strong interests in obtaining . .. the uniquely effective identifying
information that DNA provides." 91
87 See Henning, supra note 5, at 9 (explaining that although the United States Supreme Court has
yet to hear a DNA collection case, eight of the circuit courts "have upheld the 2004 version of the
federal DNA collection law, which authorized collection and analysis of DNA from people convicted of
any felony, certain sexual crimes, and crimes of violence."); see also Amerson, 483 F.3d at 79 (noting
that the Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case challenging the 2004 federal DNA collection law).
88 See Amerson 483 F.3d at 84 (referencing the Supreme Court's previous findings that blood
testing was minimally intrusive); Nicholas, 430 F. 3d at 669 (noting that the Supreme Court has "long
maintained" that the intrusion created by taking a blood sample was minimal).
89 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989) (quoting Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966)).
90 See GENETIC TESTING AND SCREENING, supra note 59 (listing the tests given to newborns soon
after birth); NEWBORN SCREENING PROGRAM, supra note 59 (stating a number of things newborns are
tested for from "one tiny sample of blood ... obtained by pricking the baby's heel").
91 430 F.3d at 669.
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2. Individual's Privacy Interest in Their DNA
The greatest hurdle to implementing a DNA at Birth law is the
individual's privacy interest in their DNA. The constitutionality of current
compulsory DNA laws has been upheld in light of the fact that arrestees,
inmates, and probationers have a diminished expectation of privacy in their
identity since they have willingly subjected themselves to the criminal
justice system by committing a voluntary criminal act. 92 Undoubtedly, this
reasoning cannot be translated to the privacy interest of an innocent
newborn, but it may still be argued that infants (or more accurately the
infant's parents) likewise have a diminished expectation of privacy in their
DNA profiles.
As legal guardians, parents have the right to make decisions on their
child's behalf and to ensure that their child's constitutional rights are not
violated. Parents might have a diminished expectation of privacy in their
child's DNA profile in light of the fact that inclusion in a government
database would benefit them if their child ever went missing or needed to
be identified for some reason. When parents consider the advantages of
having their child's DNA on file, they may be more accepting of the
process. Additionally, over the last fifty years or so, we have recognized
fewer privacy interests due to profound technological developments (such
as email, Facebook, Twitter, credit reports, public information databases,
online medical records, etc.) so it is possible that in the future people will
no longer have a socially recognized expectation of privacy in their DNA
profiles.
One major reason why parents should have a diminished expectation of
privacy in their child's DNA is the Newborn Screening Saves Lives Act of
2007, passed by President Bush in 2008.93 This Act authorized the federal
government to collect, screen, and store DNA from newborns for health
and genetic research purposes. 94 Genetic screening of newborns, which
began in the 1960s, has saved thousands of lives from diseases that may
have otherwise remained undetected. 95 Today, every state has its own
92 See Amerson, 483 F.3d at 84 (The "[a]ppellants' status as probationers, and their associated
diminished expectation of privacy make [the] physical intrusion [imposed by DNA collection] even less
invasive."); Solomon Moore, F.B.I. and States Vastly Expanding Databases of DNA, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
19, 2009, at Al ("Courts have generally upheld laws authorizing compulsory collection of DNA from
convicts and ex-convicts under supervised release, on the grounds that criminal acts diminish privacy
rights.").
93 S. 1858, 1 10th Cong. § 2 (2008).
94 Id.
95 Elizabeth Cohen, The Government Has Your Baby's DNA, CNN HEALTH, February 4, 2010,
http://www.cnn.com/2010/HEALTH/02/04/baby.dna.govemment/index.html (stating that screening has
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individual guidelines for collecting, storing, and analyzing DNA samples.96
New parents are often unaware of this process since it is authorized by the
federal government and can be done without their consent. 97 Depending on
which state a mother gives birth in, her child's DNA will be stored in a
state laboratory anywhere from a period of three months (such as in
Alabama) to indefinitely (such as in California). 98 In New York, these
DNA samples are kept and stored for twenty-seven years. 99 Since every
child's DNA is already collected and used by the government for research
purposes, there is a diminished expectation of privacy in infant DNA.
Thus, using it for identification purposes as well poses no additional
physical intrusion.
Another privacy concern associated with granting the government access
to DNA profiles is the fear that it will reveal information about individuals'
sex, race, genetic defects, and other genetic predispositions. Opponents are
primarily concerned that information regarding genetic diseases or
disorders will be used to discriminate against certain individuals, such as in
the context of health care. In response to this concern, it should be noted
that the current procedures only allow the analysis of DNA for identifying
markers, otherwise known as "junk DNA."100 Therefore, these databanks
only contain DNA profiles that can be used for identification purposes; no
physical or genetic information can be accessed. This means that the
storage of DNA in these databanks cannot be used to discriminate against
anyone. Furthermore, current law requires that the information be kept
confidential and only accessible to authorized personnel. There are
criminal penalties in place if anyone intentionally discloses these records to
unauthorized entities, tampers with the samples, or uses the information for
saved "countless newborns"); see Jeffrey R. Botkin, M.D., Newborn Screening for Nontreatable
Disorders: Assessing the New Criteria for Newborn Screenings, 19 HEALTH MATRIX 163, 163 (2009)
(discussing the remarkable success of newborn screening in preventing irreparable damage to infants).
96 See NATIONAL NEWBORN SCREENING & GENETICS RESOURCE CENTER, LABORATORY
SPECIMEN INFORMATION FOR NEWBORN SCREENING IN THE U.S. IN 2010,
http://nnsis.uthscsa.edu/xreports.aspx?XREPORTID= 1 8&FORMID=43&FCLR=1 (comparing the
various state guidelines); Cohen, supra note 96 (describing some of the differing guidelines).
97 Cohen, supra note 96; see generally Newborn Screening Saves Lives Act, S. 1858, 110th Cong.
§ 2 (2008) (authorizing state screening procedures under federal law).
98 NATIONAL NEWBORN SCREENING & GENETICS RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 97; Cohen, supra
note 96.
99 NATIONAL NEWBORN SCREENING & GENETICS RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 97; Julia Davis,
Government's DNA-mining is Out of Control, Calfornia Stores Genetic Profile Samples Indefinitely,
EXAMINER, Feb. 6, 2010, http://www.examiner.com/homeland-security-in-los-angeles/government-s-
dna-mining-is-out-of-control-califoria-stores-genetic-profile-samples-indefinitely.
100 Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 670 (2d. Cir. 2005). "Although DNA indexing has the
potential to be broadly revealing, the New York statute as written does not provide for sensitive
information to be analyzed or kept in its database. Rather, it provides only for the analysis of identifying
markers." Id. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-f.
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an unauthorized purpose.'l Critics suggest that in the future researchers
may discover that "junk DNA" does in fact contain the kind of sensitive
information that would allow the government to discriminate against
certain people and significantly intrude on their privacy.102 It should be
noted, however, that this ability does not exist in today's world, and even if
researchers were to make such a discovery, the current New York statute
prohibits and criminalizes DNA use for any unauthorized purpose.103
Finally, a system were DNA is collected at birth might even serve to
increase privacy for some people. DNA databanks have proved dispositive
in exonerating some individuals who have been wrongfully accused.104
Therefore, people who can be eliminated from a criminal investigation at
its outset, without undergoing more serious intrusions in their future, will
experience an actual increase in privacy. 05
C. Government's Needs and Program's Efficacy in Meeting Those Needs
In order for such a system to be constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment, the government's interests in implementing a DNA at Birth
program would need to outweigh individual privacy interests, and the
program must be effective in meeting the government's needs. Since we
are discussing a hypothetical proposal, rather than a program currently in
place, it will be impossible to assess the program's efficacy in meeting the
government's needs. Nevertheless, there are several interests that are
capable of discussion.
If DNA were collected at birth and stored in a state or national database,
law enforcement would be able to rapidly and accurately solve crimes right
after they occurred, rather than waiting for the perpetrator to commit
101 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-f (2011); Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 670.
102 See Henning, supra note 5, at 14 ("Fourth Amendment challenges might gain legal traction if
researchers discover that junk DNA does in fact contain clues which reveal sensitive biological or
medical information."); Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming "Abandoned" DNA: The Fourth Amendment and
Genetic Privacy, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 857, 870 (2006).
103 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-f (2011); Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 670.
104 See Klein, supra note 2 ("[This] bill, mandating the taking of DNA samples at arrest for certain
designated offenses, will not only aid immeasurably in convicting the guilty, it will also exonerate the
innocent.") (quoting William Fitzpatrick, Onondaga County District Attorney); Patrick McGeehan, New
York Plan for DNA Data in Most Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2007), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/14/nyregion/14dna.html.
105 See U.S. v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 86-87 (2d Cir. 2007) (positing that DNA profiles have the
"potential to provide a net gain in privacy for the individuals who are required to provide samples.
Having DNA on file may very well help exculpate such individuals by avoiding misidentification and,
thus, preventing more serious invasions of their privacy in the future."); see also Charles J. Nerko,
Assessing Fourth Amendment Challenges to DNA Extraction Statutes After Samson v. California, 77
FORDHAM L. REv. 917, 936 (2008) (quoting Amerson on this point).
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another offense. The governmental interest in deterring and preventing
crime is therefore very high. Such a system would also prevent innocent
people from becoming suspects in the first place. In other situations, it
would exonerate the wrongfully accused.
Outside of the criminal context, the government has a strong interest in
identifying bodily remains, such as those left after the attacks on 9/11, or in
the wake of natural tragedies such as the recent earthquake in Haiti. Also,
there would be a significant decrease in the need for paternity suits, which
would save much government time and expense.
D. Fiscal Implications of a DNA At Birth Program
Although not a constitutional concern, the fiscal implications of a DNA
at Birth program is a major issue that needs to be addressed before such a
system could ever be seriously considered. This figure can be calculated
using the following mathematical equation:
Estimated Annual Cost of DNA upon Arrest in NY X.
Annual Number of Arrestees in NY Annual Number of Births in NY
According to Bill A06186, currently before the New York State
Assembly, the projected cost of collecting DNA from every arrestee/at all
instances when fingerprints are taken in New York for one year is $55-$65
million per year. 106 For the purpose of calculating a DNA at Birth program,
this number was averaged to $60 million. According to the New York
State Division of Criminal Justice Services 2008 Crimestat Report, the
number of fingerprint transactions associated with arrests in New York for
2008 was 587,598.107 According to the vital statistics of New York State,
published by the NYS Department of Health, the number of births in New
York in 2007 was 252,662.108 After putting these numbers into the
equation above, it can be determined that the approximate cost for
maintaining a DNA at Birth database for one year in New York would be
approximately $26 million.109
While this figure may seem daunting at first, it is important to keep in
106 A. 6186, supra note 4 (projecting the cost for the 2008-09 collection year).
107 N.Y. State Div. of Crim. Justice Serv., 2008 Crimestat, supra note 27, at 44.
108 NYS DEPT. OF HEALTH, VITAL STATISTICS OF NYS 2007, TABLE 4A: LIVE BIRTH SUMMARY
BY MOTHER'S RACE/ETHNICITY, NEW YORK STATE 2007, available at
http://www.health.state.ny.us/nysdoh/vital-statistics/2007/table04a.htm. The number of births for 2007
were used in the cost analysis because at the time of writing, New York's vital statistics for 2008 had
not yet been released publically.
109 This number is rounded up from $25,795,390.
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mind that it is about half of the projected cost for the annual DNA-upon-
arrest legislation. In all reality, a DNA-upon-arrest law will likely get
passed in New York since similar laws have been passed in fifteen other
states in 2008 alone, and therefore, collecting DNA at birth definitely
seems like a more economically feasible endeavor.o10 Furthermore, the
potential benefits of such a system would outweigh the high cost, because it
would lead to reduced expenditures in other areas of law enforcement.111
Since such a program is likely to both deter criminal acts and solve other
crimes at a much higher rate, it would lead to a decrease in costs associated
with criminal investigations, prosecutions, and imprisonments.112 Since
DNA evidence often provides conclusive proof of criminality, time and
money spent on other modes of investigation and prosecution would be
greatly reduced.113
CONCLUSION
As federal and state governments are continuing to propose and enact
legislation that would expand the current compulsory DNA collection laws,
more cases are being brought before our courts to determine their
constitutionality. It only seems natural that in the future a proposal for
DNA collection at birth will be seriously considered. Although such a
system initially seems very controversial, it is necessary for people to keep
an open mind and consider the potential benefits such a system would
present to our society. In order for the wonderful capabilities of our
advanced DNA technology to be truly put to use, samples should be
collected from every citizen shortly after birth.
110 See Nat'l Conf. of St. Legislatures, supra note 1; Moore, supra note 5.
111 John P. Cronan, The Next Frontier of Law Enforcement: A Proposal for Complete DNA
Databanks, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 119, 154 (2009); see Klein, supra note 2.
112 Cronan, supra note 112, at 154; see generally Moore, supra note 5.
113 Cronan, supra note 112, at 154. "Complete databanks would solve many crimes almost
instantaneously, making other costly investigative techniques, such as police interrogations, witness
interviews, line-ups, and non-DNA laboratory tests, extraneous. Similarly, because these crimes would
be solved so quickly, investigations would require less time and resources, thereby relieving the
department's budget." Id.
328
